Abstract. Computational Indistinguishability Logic (CIL) is a logic for reasoning about cryptographic primitives in computational model. It is sound for standard model, but also supports reasoning in the random oracle and other idealized models. We illustrate the benefits of CIL by formally proving the security of a Password-Based Key Exchange (PBKE) scheme, which is designed to provide entities communicating over a public network and sharing a short password, under a session key.
Introduction
Cryptography plays a central role in the design of secure and reliable systems. It consists in the conception and analysis of protocols achieving various aspects of information security such as authentication. In particulary, the provable cryptography is defined as the conception of proofs accounting for the exact amount of security supplied by cryptographic protocols.
In the computational model, Computational Indistinguishability Logic (CIL) supports concise and intuitive proofs accross several models of cryptography. This logic features the notion of oracle system, an abstract model of interactive games in which adaptative adversaries play against a cryptographic scheme by interacting with oracles. Moreover, it states a small set of rules that capture common reasoning patterns and interface rules to connect with external reasoning. To illustrate applicability of CIL, we consider the security proof of the Password-Based Key Exchange (PBKE) protocol.
Related Work
About Security of PBKE Protocols: EKE (Encrypted Key Exchange) was introduced by Bellovin and Merritt, [1] . In their protocol, two users execute an encrypted version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, in which each flow is encrypted using the password shared between these two users as the symmetric key. Due to the simplicity of their protocol, other protocols were proposed in the literature based on it, each with its own instantiation of the encryption function such that OEKE (One-Encryption Key-Exchange) protocol.
Since 2003, E. Bresson et al., [3] , have been working on the analysis of very efficient schemes on passwordbased authenticated key exchange methods, but for which actual security was an open problem. In 2012, B. Blanchet have focused on a crytpgraphic protocol verifier, called CryptoVerif, to mechanically prove OEKE.
About CIL: DCS (Distributed and Complex Systems) is working on the logic CIL for proving concrete security of cryptographic schemes. It enables reasonning about schemes directly in the computational settings. The main contribution is to support the design of proofs at a level of abstraction which allows to bridge the gap between pencil-and-paper fundamental proofs and existing pratical verification tools (see article [7] ).
Contributions and Contents
For the first time, we bring out the applicability of CIL for formalizing computational proofs. The tool CIL allows us to give a new kind of analysis that has advantages over the traditional as in [3] and [9] . As we use a tool based on general and extended logic rules, the proofs are well constructed and easy to understand, and achieve good results.
The paper begins with a recall of the framework to capture cryptographic games(Section 2). The main technical contributions of the paper are: i) an extension of reasoning tools for oracle systems (Section 3); ii) a formal proof in CIL of an efficient PBKE protocol (Section 4).
Oracle systems

Preliminaries
ICM: An ideal block cipher is a totally random permutation from l-bit strings to l-bit strings.
ROM: A random oracle is a mathematical function mapping every possible query to a uniformly random response from its output domain.
Miscellaneous: Let 1 to denote the unit type and (x, y) to denote pairs. For a set A, U (A) defines the set of uniform distributions over A. Let to denote arguments that are not used or elements of tuples whose value is irrevelant in the final distribution.
Semantics
The interaction between an oracle system and an adversary proceeds in three successive phases:
-the initialization oracle sets the initial memory distributions of the oracle system; -the adversary performs computations, updates its state and submits a query to the oracle system; the oracle system performs computations, updates its state, and replies to the adversary, which updates its state; -the adversary outputs a result calling the finalization oracle.
During his attack, the adversary has access to the oracles, which modelize his capacities to obtain (partial) information or to execute some party of the protocol in the reality. His resources are bounded by two parameters: the number of queries he performs to the oracles and his running time.
Oracle systems and adversaries
Oracle systems and adversaries are modeled as stateful systems meant to interact with each another. An oracle system O is a stateful system that provides oracle access to adversaries and given by:
-sets of oracle memories and of oracles; -a query domain, an answer domain and the related implementation; -a distinguished initial memory, and distinguished oracles o I for initialization and o F for finalization.
Oracle systems O and O are compatible iff they have the same sets of oracle names and the query and the answer domains of each oracle name coincide in both oracle systems. We build compatible systems out of systems we have already defined by modifying the implementation of one of the oracles.
Events
The interaction between oracle system and adversary seems as this of the pattern consisting in the query of an oracle, the computation of an answer by the oracle, and the update of its state by the adversary. This is formalized as a transition system, where a step consists in one occurence of the pattern. Security properties abstract away from the state of adversaries and are modeled using traces. A trace is an execution sequence from which the adversary memories have been erased. The subset of traces verifying the predicate is considered to assign a probability to an event defined by a predicate.
For a step-predicate φ, let the event "eventually φ" be denoted by F φ and correspond to φ satisfied at one step of the trace. Furthermore, the event "always φ", denoted by G φ , is true iff φ is satisfied at every step of the trace. You can find an example of this concept in Appendix A.3.
For more details and examples, you can see the Appendix A or refer to the article [7] . 
Computational Indistinguishability Logic
E ∼ ε O is valid iff for every (k, t)-adversary A, | P r[A | O : R = True ∧ E] − P r[A | O : R = True ∧ E] |≤ ε(k, t) . As O ∼ ε O ⇔ O True ∼ ε O ,
Rules and their extensions
We expose briefly the rules used in our proof on Figure (1) . You can find more classic and extended rules in Appendix B.1. 
Contexts
A context C is an intermediary between an oracle system O and adversaries. One can compose a O-context C with O to obtain a new oracle system C
[O] and with a C[O]-adversary to obtain a new O-adversary C A.
Procedures for contexts differ of these for oracle systems: one that transfers calls from the adversary to the oracles and another one that tranfers answers from the oracles to the adversary. See Appendix B.2.
Bisimulation
Game-based proofs proceed by transforming an oracle system into an equivalent one, or in case of imperfect simulation into a system that is equivalent up to some bad event. The notion of bisimulation-up-to is defined as two probabilistic transition systems are bisimilar until the failure of a condition on their tuple statestransitions. Bisimulations are closely related to obversational equivalence and relational Hoare logic and allow to justify proofs by simulations. Besides, bisimulations-up-to subsume the Fundamental Lemma of Victor Shoup. See Appendix B.3.
Determinization
Using the concept of automata determinization technique, the definition is based on the possibility to decompose states of a system into two components and to exhibit a distribution γ allowing to obtain the second component given the first one. See Appendix B.4.
CIL Security Proof for an efficient PBKE
Preliminaries
In the computational model, messages are bitstrings, cryptographic primitives are functions from bitstrings to bitstrings and adversary is any Probabilistic Polynomial time Turing Machine. Scheme: We denote objects describing the model: -two sets U sers and Servers such that u ∈ [U sers] and s ∈ [Servers]; -for the arithmetic, G =< g > is a cyclic group of l-bit prime order q andḠ = G \ 1 G = {g x | x ∈ Z * q } (g is a fixed parameter); -for i = {0, 1}, l i is the parameter of data size for Hash function H i ; -a set P assword as a small dictionary (polynomial in the security parameter), of size N , equipped with the uniform distribution. We want to bound the probability for an adversary, within time t, and with less than N u sessions with a client, N s sessions with a server (active attacks), and asking q H hash queries and q E Encryption/Decryption queries, to distinguish the session key from a random key.
One-Encryption Key-Exchange (OEKE), a password-based key exchange
On Figure ( 2) (with a honest execution of the OEKE protocol), the protocol runs between a client u and a server s. The session key space associated to this protocol is {0, 1} l 0 equipped with the uniform distribution. u and s initially share a low-quality string pw, the password, from P assword.
Client u
Server s pw pw accept ← false ; terminate ← false accept ← false ; terminate ← false The real game O 1 0 : This game consists of: initialization and finalization oracles, Encryption/Decryption oracles, Hash oracles, oracles that simulate the protocol (named U 1 , S 1 , U 2 and S 2 ), Execute oracle, Test oracle and Reveal oracle. In the initialization oracle, the bit b is equal to 1 and hence, the Test oracle returns the real value of the session key.
var X :=⊥; var θ :=⊥; var ϕ :=⊥; var sk :=⊥;
The real game O 0 0 : As for O 1 0 , this game consists of exactly the same oracles. The differences are in the initialization oracle where b = 0 and in the Test oracle where is returned a random value for sk.
Summary:
In a first part, we bound the probabilities that two step-predicates occur. The first one, Cl, is for formalizing the collisions. The second one, φ pw , is for describing the dependence on the password in the oracles. In a second part, we write the general proof in order to obtain the indistinguishability between O 0 0 and O 1 0 , considering that the two previous step-prediactes can not occur. For that, we describe the transformations of the game O 1 0 , step by step, until finding a simplified game. We notice that we obtain the same thing for the game O 0 0 . These two parts are very similar: the same tranformations are made in order to obtain the wanted result. Therefore, we explain clearly the first proof and we expose briefly the second one.
N.B.: The list L pw is created to simulate the oracles E and D in ICM. We suppose that the domain of E matches with the group generated by g. L O is defined as the list stocking the tuple (oracle o, query q, answer a),
4.3 Proof for bounding the probability of the step-predicate φ pw
C.1. Eliminating the Collisions :
We want to eliminate collisions during Hash and Encryption/Decryption processes. We formalize the small probability of that an inappropriate collision could let the adversary to find a sequence without any required effort.
Let the step-predicate Cl be defined on the triple ((o, q, a), m, ) as the conjunction of the clauses:
To complete and restrict the definition of Cl, let us introduce two other clauses:
Since Cl can only be satisfied when querying 2(q−1) . We perform the same analysis for the other game obtaining O 0 0 : ε 0 F Cl . For further, at each step, we suppose there is no collision when modifying the game O 1 0 . We can introduce a particular equivalence relation under the step-predicate ¬Cl in order to avoid the collisions, since it steps in over memories. We use the extented notion of bisimulation (for more details, see Appendix B.3). To conclude the proof, we bound the probability of such collisions (this avoids the repetition of the value ε 0 at each transformation).
C.2. Creating the independence from the password in the oracles:
We want to eliminate dependence on pw in all the oracles. We formalize the probability that the adversary guesses the good password and succeeds in the acquisition of the session key.
We define the step-predicate φ pw = φ pw1 ∨ φ pw2 , where φ pw1 and φ pw2 are written as follows:
φ pw steps in over memories only. We want to find the value ε 1 such that:
We transform the game O 1 0 until finding a game wherein the password is sampled in the finalization oracle. Therefore, we can obtain easily the optimal result
. Indeed, this means that the adversary can test at most one password per session.
Removing the Encryption in the oracle S 1
The unique way for the adversary to gain something is to correctly guess pw, by either sending a Y that is really an encryption under it of some well-chosen message or using it to decrypt Y . In O 1 1 , we change S 1 modelizing the Encryption inside this oralce.
In a particular case, we do not receive an exponent ϕ but ⊥: that happens when Y has been previously obtained as a ciphertext returned by an Encryption query. Let the step-predicate Exp be this case:
and O 1 1 are in bisimulation-up-to ¬Exp, using as relation R 1 the equality on the common components of their states in M
Hence, we apply the rule I-BisG2 to result in:
I-BisG2
Applying the rule Fail allows to obtain O
Splitting the Hash lists
We want to be sure that u will offer a good Authenticator and s will accept it. Therefore, we modify the oracle U 2 in order to get a honest value for Y . We split the lists of the two public hash oracles H 0 and
are R 2 -bismilar up to ¬φ pw1 . The equivalence relation R 2 between states m and m is as follows:
Then, applying the rule I-BisG2, we find:
I-BisG2
such that ε 3 + ε 4 = ε 1 . We notice that:
Randomizing the Hash oracles
In O 1 3 , we sample the value of Y . Therefore, we no longer use the private hash functions since we internalize the hash functions in another way with the random Y . We modify the oracles U 2 and S 2 .
Let the step-predicate Auth be the conjunction of the following clauses:
The adversary can not see the link between Y and Y , except if he calls E(pw, ) or D(pw, ).
We notice that the probability that F φpw2 occurs is very negligible since we suppose that the adversary can not get the password. Since we have F Auth∨φpw2 = F Auth ∨ (F φpw2 ∧ G ¬Auth ), we expose that F φpw2 ∧ G ¬Auth occurs with the probability ε 5 and F Auth with ε 6 . Using the rule Fail, we get ε 5 = Nu+Ns q−1 . We want to establish the indistinguishability between O 1 2 and O 1 3 up to ¬Auth ∧ ¬φ pw2 . We exhibit two equivalence relations R 3 between both systems. Indeed, states m and m are in relation:
On the left hand, focusing on the step-predicate φ pw1 , we apply the rule I-BisG2 to result in:
On the right hand, since we have
, we simplify the line. Focusing on the step-predicate φ pw2 , we apply the rule I-BisG2 to result in:
We focus on the CDH problem to obtain the value of ε 6 (for more details about the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in G, see Appendix B.2). Hence, we write the game O 1 4 as a context C of CDH. The oracle system CDH captures the game played by an adversary to find the Diffie-Hellman instance (A, B) .
We define the step-predicate Auth' as follows:
The adversary has returned a pair (R 1 , R 2 ) that is a valid authentication when
. Therefore, applying the rule B-Sub, we get:
B-Sub
Moreover, the games O 
¬Cl , mR 4 m iff there is the equality on the common components of their states, knowing that the added lists L A and L B are completely determinated using the other common tables. 
UpToBad
Sorting the password in the finalization oracle We a simplified game such that all the oracles are independent of pw. We modify the finalization oracle in order to draw the password only at the end of O . Then, applying the rule B-Det-Left, we find: 
We perform the same analysis for the other game obtaining that O 0 0 :ε 1 F φpw . For further, at each step, we suppose there is no dependence on the password when modifying the game O 1 0 . We can introduce a particular equivalence relation under the step-predicate ¬φpw in order to avoid a query from the adversary with the good pw, since it steps in over memories using the list L O . From that, E and D no longer give some evidence about the password to the adversary. This process enables to avoid the repetition of the value ε 1 at each transformation in the general proof.
Proof Tree: We illustrate the proof tree for bounding the probability of the step-predicate φpw on Figure ( 3). For convenience, we understand that each event F Predicate is associated to the event G ¬Cl and b is the bit randomly sampled in the initialization oracle.
N.B.: Defining the step-predicate φpw allows us to construct a proof which seems the more general possible. Indeed, we notice that it can be applied in another password-based protocol proof. From that, we hope to get security proofs more easily since we have already met the concept. Since the two conditions we described previously seem revelant, we transform the game O 1 0 in several steps under G ¬Cl ∧ G ¬φpw . The description of the general proof is less developed since we use the same transformations than for the proof for bounding the probability of φpw. Indeed, except the last game O 1 5 using the concept of determinization, we will apply in the same order each step using in the previous proof. 
Removing the Encryption in the oracle
Tree' 3 : Fig. 3 . Proof Tree for the probability that the step-predicate φpw occurs
Hence, using the rule Fail, we get O
Ns ×q E q−1 F Exp and we apply the rule I-BisCd to result in: are R 2 -bismilar up to ¬φ pw1 (see page 6). We define the equivalence relation R 2 between states m and m as follows:
I-BisCd
Splitting the Hash lists
We obtain O 1 2 : 0 F φ pw1 since we consider the independence of the password in the oracles. Then, applying the rule I-BisCd, we find:
I-BisCd
Randomizing the Hash oracles In O 1 3 , sampling Y modifies the oracles U 2 and S 2 (refer to page 8). Auth is defined page 8 and φ pw2 page 6. We notice that the event F φpw2 do not occur since we suppose that the adversary can not get the password. Using the equality F Auth∨φpw2 = F Auth ∨ (F φpw2 ∧ G ¬Auth ) = F Auth , we calculate the value ε 3 of the probability that the event F Auth occurs.
We
Hence, we apply the rule I-BisCd to result in:
In the previous proof, we obtained that O 
Digest
Using four steps and the rule TrCd, we find O 1 0
. To achieve the conclusion, we compare the games O 
I-BisCd
We use the rule TrCd to conclude to: O 0 0 
t). General Proof Tree:
We illustrate the proof tree on Figure (4) . Most of the time, we use the rules I-BisCd and TrCd under the condition G ¬Cl ∧ G ¬φpw . For convenience, we understand that each event F Predicate is associated to the event G ¬Cl ∧ G ¬φpw and b is the bit randomly sampled in the initialization oracle.
Conclusion
We gave a manual formal proof of the OEKE protocol, as the first application of the tool CIL. This proof is well contructed under two parts; The first proof seems complicated to find the probability of one-step predicate but stays clear. As this proof is similar to the general proof, therefore the latter is concise, precise and easy to understand. We obtained a new kind of security proof for OEKE based on general and extended logic rules, instead of "writing" proofs or "rewriting" proof using CryptoVerif.
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Fig. 4. Proof Tree for OEKE
Theorem 1. Let us consider the OEKE protocol, where P assword is a finite dictionnary of size N equipped with the uniform distribution. Let A be a (k, t)-adversary against the security of OEKE within a time bound t, with less than Nu + Ns interactions with the parties and asking q H hash queries and q E Encryption/Decryption queries. Then we have:
We stayed careful of putting realistic hypothesis for elements of the proof, as for functions in ROM and ICM. We obtained the optimal term For technical reasons, they used a collision-resistant hash function H 1 . After we began our article, in the paper [9], they proved the security of OEKE using the tool CryptoVerif. The boundary was improved relative to the former proof since they reached the optimal result Nu+Ns N . As in these papers, we obtained the optimal term but using a new kind of analysis under CIL.
Moreover, the logic CIL is sufficiently developed: it can be used easily and efficiently to construct computational proofs. 
A Oracle systems
A.1 Oracle systems and adversaries
An oracle system is a stateful system that provides oracle access to adversaries. 
Definition 1. An oracle system O is given by: -sets Mo of oracle memories and No of oracles, -for each o ∈ No, a query domain In(o), an answer domain Out(o) and an implementation Oo
Two oracle systems O and O are compatible iff they have the same sets of oracle names, and the query and the answer domains of each oracle name coincide in both oracle systems. When building a compatible oracle system from another one, it is thus sufficient to provide its set of memories, its initial memory and the implementation of its oracles.
Adversaries interact with oracle systems by making queries and receiving answers. An exchange for an oracle system O is a triple (o, q, a) where o ∈ No, q ∈ In(o) and a ∈ Out(o). We let Xch be the set of exchanges. Initial and final exchanges are defined in the obvious way, by requiring that o is an initialization and finalization oracle respectively (the sets of these exchanges are denoted by Xch I and Xch F respectively). The sets Que of queries and Ans of answers are respectively defined as
Definition 2. An adversary A for an oracle system O is given by a set Ma of adversary memories, an initial memorȳ ma ∈ Ma and functions for querying and updating
Informally, the interaction between an oracle system and an adversary proceeds in three successive phases: the initialization oracle sets the initial memory distributions of the oracle system and of the adversary. Then, A performs computations, updates its state and submits queries to O. In turn, O performs computations, updates its state, and replies to A, which updates its state. Finally, A outputs a result by calling the finalization oracle.
A.2 Semantics
Definition 3. A transition system S consists of: -a (countable non-empty) set M of memories (states) with a distinguished initial memorym, -a set of actions with distinguished subsets of I and F of initialization and finalization actions, -a (partial) transition function step : M D( ×M ).
A partial execution sequence of S is a sequence of ζ of the form m 0 , q i , a i ). If k = 1 then ζ is a step. If m 0 =m, x 1 ∈ I and x k ∈ F then ζ is an execution sequence of length k. A probabilistic transition system S induces a sub-distribution on executions, denoted S, such that the probability of a finite execution sequence ζ is P r[
A transition system is of height k ∈ N if all its executions have length at most k: in this case, S is a distribution.
Definition 4. Let O be an oracle system and A be an O-adversary. The composition A | O is a transition system such that M = Ma ×Mo, the initial memory is (ma,mo), the set of actions is
= Xch, I = Xch I and F = Xch F , and
An adversary is called k-bounded if A | O is of height k. This means that A calls the finalization oracle after less than k interactions with O. A | O may be ill-defined for unbounded adversaries, since step A|O (ma, mo) may be a sub-distribution. Throughout the paper, we only consider bounded adversaries, i.e. that are k-bounded for some k.
A.3 Events
Security properties abstract away from the state of adversaries and are modeled using traces. Informally, a trace τ is an execution sequence η from which the adversary memories have been erased. 
is a predicate over O-traces, whereas an extended O-event E is a predicate over partial O-traces.
The probability of an (extended) event is derived directly from the definition of A | O: since each execution sequence η induces a trace T (η) simply by erasing the adversary memory at each step, one can define for each trace τ , the set T −1 (τ ) of execution sequences that are erased to τ , and for every (generalized) event E, the probability:
Constructions and proofs in CIL use several common operations on (extended) events and traces. First, one can define the conjunction, the disjunction, etc, of events. Moreover, one can define for every predicate P over Xch × Mo × Mo the events "eventually P " F P and "always P " G P that correspond to P being satisfied by one step and all steps of the trace respectively.
Reduction-based arguments require that adversaries can partially simulate behaviors. In some cases, adversaries must test whether a predicate ϕ ⊆ Xch × Mo × Mo holds for given values. Since the adversary has no access to the oracle memory, we say that ϕ is testable iff for all x, m 1 , m 1 , m 2 , m 2 , we have ϕ(x, m 1 , m 1 ) iff ϕ(x, m 2 , m 2 ) (that is ϕ depends only on the exchange).
Given two traces τ and τ , we write τ Rτ iff for every i ∈ [1, k], we have m i Rm i , where:
Moreover, we say that two events E and E' are R-compatible, written ERE', iff E(τ ) is equivalent to E'(τ ) for every traces τ and τ such that τ Rτ .
B Computational Indistinguishability Logic
B.1 Statements and Rules
As cryptographic proofs rely on assumptions, CIL manipulates sequents of the form ∆ ⇒ ω, where ∆ is a set of statements (the assumptions) and ω is a statement (the conclusion). Validity extends to sequents ∆ ⇒ ω in the usual manner. Given a set ∆ of statements, |= ∆ iff |= ψ for every ψ ∈ ∆. Then ∆ |= ω iff |= ∆ implies |= ω. For clarity and brevity, our presentation of CIL omits hypotheses and the standard structural and logical rules for sequent calculi.
Theorem 2. Every sequent ∆ ⇒ ϕ provable in CIL is also valid, i.e. ∆ |= ϕ.
Judgments CIL considers negligibility statements of the form O :ϕ E, where E is an event. A statement O :ϕ E is valid, written |= O :ϕ E, iff for every (k, t)-adversary A, P r(A | O : E) ≤ ε(k, t).
We also consider indistinguishability statements of the form O ∼ε O , where O and O are compatible oracle systems which expect a boolean as result.
where R = True is shorthand for F λ(o,q,a) . o=o F ∧q=True . Therefore, we formalize the indistinguishability of distributions yielded by systems under condition, the latter being written as an event of systems. Let E be an event of O and
As cryptographic proofs rely on assumptions, CIL manipulates sequents of the form ∆ ⇒ ω, where ∆ is a set of statements (the assumptions) and ω is a statement (the conclusion). Validity extends to sequents ∆ ⇒ ω in the usual manner. Given a set ∆ of statements, |= ∆ iff |= ψ for every ψ ∈ ∆. Then ∆ |= ω iff |= ∆ implies |= ω. Figures (5) , (6) and (7), we expose rules that support equational reasoning and consequence in Hoare logic, rules that were extended rules found during the conception of the proofs in this article, and rules that are used mainly in the proofs in this article. Let O, O and O" be compatible oracle systems, E, E 1 and E 2 be events of O, O and O", and ϕ, ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 be step-predicates. More precisely, CIL features a rule to compute an upper-bound on the probability of an event from the number of oracle calls, and from the probability that a single oracle call triggers that event. Let ϕ be a predicate on Xch × Mo × Mo and define, for every o ∈ No, the probability εo as coincide in a precise mathematical sense. Despite its seemingly naivety, the relationship captures many reduction arguments used in cryptographic proofs and yields CIL rules that allow proving many schemes. The definition of contexts is very similar to that of oracle systems, except that procedures are implemented by two functions: one that transfers calls from the adversary to the oracles and another one that tranfers answers from the oracles to the adversary (possibly after some computations). The composition of an adversary with a context is slightly more subtle and requires that the new adversary stores the current query in its state.
Rules On
O ∼ε i E i (i ∈ I) E ⇒ i∈I E i O : i∈I εi E UR O :ε Fϕ Fail O :ε F¬ϕ O ≡ R,ϕ O O ∼ε O I-Bis O ≤ det,γ O O :ε E • π O :ε E B-Det-Left O :ε E • C C[O] : ε E B-Sub O :ε E 1 ∧ Gϕ O ≡ R,ϕ O E 1 RE 2 O :ε E 2 ∧ Gϕ B-BisG O :ε 2 E 2 O :ε 1 F¬ϕ O ≡ R,ϕ O E 1 RE 2 O : ε1+ε2 E 1 UpToBad Fig. 5. Classic rules O E2 ∼ ε1 O E 2 ⇒ E 1 O :ε 2 E 1 ∧ ¬E 2 O :ε 2 E 1 ∧ ¬E 2 O E1 ∼ ε1+ε2 O URCd O : ε F ϕ Fail2 O E1 ∼ ε1 O O E2 ∼ ε2 O" O E1∨E2 ∼ ε1+ε2 O" TrCd Fig. 6. Extended rules O :ε 1 Fϕ 1 ∧ Gϕ 2 O :ε 2 F¬ϕ 2 O ≡ R,ϕ2 O O : ε1+ε2 Fϕ 1 B-BisG2 O :ε F¬ϕ 2 ∧ Gϕ 1 O ϕ1 ≡ R,ϕ2 O O Gϕ 1 ∼ ε O I-BisCd O E1∧E2 ∼ ε2 O O :ε 1 ¬E 1 ∧ E 2 O :ε 1 ¬E 1 ∧ E 2 O E2 ∼ ε1+ε2 O FTrC− → c I (x, mc))(λ((o, ), ). o = o I ) and range(C− → c F (x, mc))(λ((o, ), ). o = o F ). We let Resc = In(c F ).
An indistinguishability context is an O-context C such that
Definition 8. The application of an O-context C to a C[O]-adversary A defines an O-adversary C A such that:
-the set of memories is Mc × Ma × Quec and the initial memory is (mc,ma, ) -the transition function is: Context CDH used in the proofs
CDH assumption in G
Let G = g be a finite cyclic group of order a l-bit prime number q, where the operation is denoted multiplicatively. We give an oracle system CDH such that:
-the memories map the variable g to the values in G and the variables α and β to the values [1..(q − 1)]; -for one such variable g, the initialization oracle draws uniformly at random values for α and β and outputs (g α , g β ); -the finalization oracle takes as input an element of G (in addition to a memory).
Bounding the number of calls of the adversary to the oracles is irrevelant. Let 1 k be the function mapping o I and o F to 1. Given a negligible function ε, the ε − CDH assumption holds for the group G iff for all (1 k 
Formalization of CDH assumption:
We define an oracle system CDH to capture the game played by an adversary to find the Diffie-Hellman instance (A, B) . We implement this oracle as follows:
else return 0 endif
Context of CDH assumption
For this part, we write the game O 1 4 as a context C of CDH. We simulate the oracles using the random selfreducibility of the Diffie-Hellman problem, given one CDH instance (A, B). 
) endif return 1
B.3 Bisimulation
Game-based proofs often proceed by transforming an oracle system into an equivalent one, or in case of imperfect simulation into a system that is equivalent up to some bad event. We reason in terms of probabilistic transition systems, using a mild extension of the standard notion of bisimulation. More specifically, we define the notion of bisimulation-up-to, where two probabilistic transition systems are bisimilar until the failure of a condition on their transitions. The definition of bisimulation is recovered by considering bisimulation-up-to the constant predicate True.
Let 
where C is the equivalence class of m 1 under R.
Bisimulations are closely related to obversational equivalence and relational Hoare logic, and allow to justify proofs by simulations. Besides, bisimulations-up-to subsume the Fundamental Lemma of Victor Shoup. Then, we introduce an extension of this concept, taking account of a particular equivalence relation included in a more restricted set of memories. 
B.4 Determinization
Bisimulation is stronger than language equivalence, and can not always be used to hope from one game to another. In particular, bisimulation can not be used for eager/lazy sampling, or for extending the internal state of the oracle system. The goal of this section is to introduce a general construction, inspired from the subset construction for determinizing automata, to justify such transitions. We consider two oracles systems O and O and assume that states m ∈ M o can be seen as pairs (m, m") ∈ Mo × M o" . There are two ways to compute the probability to end up (m, m") for a fixed m" knowing that the step starts with a state of first component m. The first is to perform the exchange in O and then draw m" according to a distribution γ. The second is to look at all possible m" which γ map to m and then to perform the exchange in O . Imposing the equality between these two ways of computing probabilities is going to compel the same equality to hold for steps, which in turn propagates to traces. We define a projection function π from O -traces to O-traces by extending the projection from Mo × Mo" to Mo. Proof Let A be a (k, t)-adversary for oracle system O. Let ϕ be a step-predicate in Xch ×M ×M . We denote by T the set of traces satisfying Fϕ. We recall that the event "eventually ϕ", written Fϕ, means ϕ being satisfied at one step of a trace. Let I be the family of oracles o that can ensure that the step-predicate ϕ can be satisfied, I ⊆ No. We define n as the cardinal of the set No and for one oracle o ∈ No, ko is the maximal number of its queries.
C Proofs for extended rules
Let we denote ε as the maximal number common to all oracles in I First, we divide traces of set T in subgroups using equivalence relation. Two traces are related iff ϕ is true for the first time at step i for a query to oracle o. Classes are denoted C(i, o, j), where j = o ∈I k o is the number of good queries (i.e. the queries to oracles in I), and realize a partition of T . Second, we let T be the projection mapping sequences of steps to partial traces (see for more details Section 2.4). Then, by definition, the probability that a system yields a trace τ is the sum of the probabilities that the system yields execution η projecting to τ , which we write 
